“The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless” is an often-repeated line from Steven Weinberg. He won the Nobel Prize for an important step toward a unified understanding of nature. He never meant that life is meaningless; he only meant that we won’t find the answer in nature. However, we do find meaning in nature, if we know how to look for it. Edith Stein’s philosophy brings this out beautifully.

Stein describes our making sense of our world as a back-and-forth between meaning found and meaning bestowed. For any individual creature to be, it must have meaning, and this is how we recognize it. Then we act upon it, and if we do so well, we add meaning through our meaningful actions. In other words, in our primary experience of the creatures we find in nature, there is both meaning found and meaning bestowed.

But when Stein develops her philosophy of science and scholarship, she points to two very different poles. On one end are the humanities. They study the expressions of the human spirit and how it is structured by values. But there is an important caveat. As embodied creatures, we cannot set aside our psychology. Psychology leads scholars to biology and from there to physics. This is the opposite pole. Now, there doesn’t seem to be any meaning left.

But an individual creature in nature is never just physics. An oak tree is never just a passing arrangement of elementary particles in the evolution of the cosmos since the Big Bang. For us, nature is physical matter which gives rise to life and individual living beings. From our perspective as individual living beings, we encounter the universe as a physical reality and understand it as the condition of life’s existence. A universe without life and the multitude of individual creatures it makes possible might indeed be meaningless, but our cosmos brought forth life, which brought forth each of us, who brought forth physics as part of the knowledge by which we make sense of the universe. A universe that makes such knowledge possible is not neutral ground that could mean anything.

I find the way Stein balances being, meaning, and the various sciences a beautiful middle way. It avoids two extremes. One holds that meaning is entirely our own creation, so that nature, lacking meaning apart from what we make of it, is owed nothing. The other holds that we are enslaved by biological necessity, which denies the originality of human action. The first makes too little of nature apart from us, and the second makes too much.

Philosophers of science have done considerable work showing that scientific practice is inseparably linked to the values pursued by scientists. Questions asked (or not) and evidence deemed relevant (or not) depend largely on what scientists consider important. But Stein brings out how being and meaning are entangled, which leads us to another task for the philosophy of science: understanding how science relates to meaning.

(Image credit: ESO/José Francisco Salgado, josefrancisco.org)